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HOW DIFFERENT IS JAPANESE
CORPORATE FINANCE? AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE INFORMATION
CONTENT OF NEW SECURITY ISSUES
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues
in Japan from January1,1985 to May 31, 1991. The sample includes public equity, private
equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt and convertible debt issues. Contrary to the
U.S., the announcement of convertible debt issues is accompanied by a significant positive
abnormal return of 1.05%. The announcement of equity issues has a positive abnormal return
ofO.45%, significant at the 0.10 level, but this positive abnormal return can be attributed to one
year in our sample and is offset by a negative issue date abnormal return of -1.01%. The
abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that for equity issues (but not for
convertible debt issues), large Japanese firms have significant negative announcement abnormal
returns. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares
basedon differentconsiderations than American managers.
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and NBERSection 1. Introduction.
The stock-price reaction to new security issues by American firms has been examined
extensively. The existing literature shows convincingly that the announcement of new public
domestic (as opposed to offshore) security issues by U.S. firms is associated with a decrease in
the firms' stock price that increases with the risk of the security issued: there is no significant
effect For AAA debt, a significant drop for convertible debt, and a larger drop for equity issues.'
The most widely accepted interpretation For these results is that new issues convey information
about the value of the issuing firms equity. If managers maximize the wealth of existing
shareholders, they avoid issuing securities at prices such that the buyers of new securities would
benefit at the expense of the existing shareholders. Therefore, an issue of a risky security is
evidence that managers believe that the firm is not undervalued too much by the market.
It is widely argued that managers in Japan pursue different objectives than managers in
the U.S.7 Some view this difference in a favorable light, arguing that Japanese managers do not
have to focus on short-term results and can take a long view which allows them to produce more
wealth for shareholders. Others view this difference as evidence that Japanese managers are
more interested in pursuing objectives such as the maximization of market share than in
maximizing shareholder wealth. The purported difference in the objectives of managers between
Japan and the U.S. makes Japan a good testing ground for corporate finance theories developed
in the U.S. In particular, similar stock-price reactions to new security issues in the two countries
would make it harder to believe that there are significant differences in managerial incentives
between the two countries.
1 See Smith (1986) and Masulis(1988) for a review of the evidence and of its interpretation.
Shyam-Sunder (1991) finds that the stock-price reaction to debt issues is not related to the rating.
2 See, for instance, Porter(1992) and Kester (1991). In contrast, Kaplan (1994) stresses the
commonalities in managerial compensation and turnover between Japan and the U.S.
1There exists some indication that stock-price reactions to new issues are different for
Japanese firms. Kato and Shalheim (1992) show that the stock-price reaction to equity issues is
significantly positive from January 1984 to March 1968.' However, their study uses as the event
date the Board meeting date when the firm decides to issue equity, which makes their evidence
not directly comparable to American evidence which uses event dates obtained from the Wall
Street Journal. Further, they do not exclude firms which simultaneously announce a stock
dividend from their sample.
Kang, Kim, Park and Stulz (1994) investigate the stock-price reaction to offshore warrant
bond issues for Japanese firms using announcements in the Financial Times. Their study has the
advantage of using event dates similar to the ones used for offshore issues by American firms.
However, its disadvantage is that it focuses on offshore markets and does not include equity.
Nevertheless, they find a positive significant stock-price reaction to warrant bond issues and
argue that Japanese firms do not behave like American firms in their decision to issue new
securities. American firms issue risky securities such as stock and convertible debt following
periods of positive excess returns. In contrast, excess returns prior to warrant bond issues by
Japanese firms are insignificantly negative. This piece of evidence suggests that Japanese
managers do not care as much about the wealth redistribution effects of new issues. Kang et al.
(1994) argue that one possible explanation is that corporate control arrangements in Japan are
such that the long-term investors are like the fixed-fraction investors analyzed in Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994), i.e., investors who hold a fixed fraction of all the firm's securities and receive
Hanaeda (1993) investigates the stock-price reaction of seasoned equity issues from 1975
to 1983. His study provides estimates of monthly market model prediction errors, where month
zero is the month of the offering. He finds a positive abnormal return for the offering month and
the month before of slightly more than one percent. He provides no estimates of statistical
significance.
2a fixed fraction of all its payouts. This is because (1) these investors want to keep their stake in
the firm constant, so that they participate in new issues, (2) some of them hold debt as well as
equity! and (3) these investors have business relationships with the firms in which they invest, so
that they gain when these firms invest even if their shares do not increase in value. If it is correct
to view Japanese long-term investors as fixed-fraction investors and if managers maximize the
wealth of these investors, the existing theoretical literature suggests that security issues should
not be informative about the mispricing of existing securities.5
In this paper, we investigate further the stock-price reaction to new issues in Japan by
using a large database of new issues for which we have announcement dates from the morning
edition of the Nihon Kelial Shlnbun, which is the equivalent of the Wall Street Joumal for Japan.
This sample covers the period from January 1, 1985, to May 31, 1991. Hence, the sample allows
us to investigate whether the abnormal returns to new issue announcements are related to the
bull market. With this database, our announcement dates and sample selection procedures are
equivalent to what researchers have used for U.S. domestic issues. Our sample includes public
equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt, and convertible debt issues. The
number of straight debt and warrant debt issues is too small to permit a detailed analysis,
however. We first use our sample to establish that stock-price reactions to new issues are indeed
different for Japanese firms. In particular, we find positive announcement returns for both equity
issues and convertible issues.
We then explore four possible interpretations for the difference in results:
1. Institutional differences and/or market Inefficiencies. The institutional setting for
'See Gerlach (1992), Gilson and Roe (1993) and Kester (1991) for analyses which stress the
complex relationships between long-term investors in Japan and the firms they invest in.
See Dybvig and Zender (1991), Persons (1994) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1994).
3security issues in Japan is strongly different from the one in the U.S. It could therefore be that
the Japanese institutional setting allows firms to manipulate security prices around security
offerings. Alternatively, the disclosure process could be such that issues are not a surprise when
announced. Our evidence is inconsistent with the view that the announcement is fully anticipated
since we find significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement date. We find a
significant negative abnormal return at the offering date of equity issues which is much larger in
absolute value than the abnormal return observed in the U.S. and which is larger than the
announcement abnormal return. We do not find this pattern with convertible bond issues: for
convertible bond issues there is a positive announcement effect and a positive issue date return.
2. Deregulation effects. The Eighties are an abnormal period in Japan because of
deregulation. We find the stock-price reaction for convertible debt issue announcements of firms
which have no convertible debt on their balance sheet is significantly higher than the stock-price
reaction for issues by other firms. A plausible interpretation of this result is that, because or the
relaxation of eligibility criteria for the issuance of convertible debt issues, a firm's first convertible
debt issue provides information to the markets that the firm is becoming more independent frorn
banks.6
3. "Bubble economy" effects. The Japanese stock market experienced very large
positive returns during the second half of the 1980s followed by a spectacular crash at the
beginning of the 1990s, so that the Nikkei 225 index tripled from 1985 to 1989 and then lost the
gains it had made. Some observers believe that the increase in the Japanese stock market
corresponds to a "bubble" that cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals.' These
observers might argue that poitive abnormal returns to risky security issues is just another
• See Hoshi,Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993).
See French and Poterba (1991) for a discussion of this period.
4example of irrationality associated with the "bubble" economy and point to the fact that Kato and
Schalheim (1992) find negative abnormal returns for equity issues in the first half of the 1970s.
Though the positive stock-price reactions associated with equity issue announcements are highest
in 1965 and 1987 in our sample, our evidence does not indicate that abnormal returns in 1990
and 1991 are similar to those observed in the U.S. and, consequently, the differences in abnormal
returns between the two countries persist after the end of the bull market in Japan.
4. Differences in corporate control mechanisms. If differences in control methanisms
explain pail or all of our results, one would expect that the Japanese firms which are most similar
to U.S. firms should have stock-price reactions similar to US. firms. We first explore whether non-
Keiretsu firms have stock-price reactions similar to those of U.S.. firms and find that in our sample
the distinction between Keiretsu and non-Keiretsu firms is largelyuninformative. We then explore
whether large Japanese firms, where management is presumably less constrained by the web
of relationships in which Japanese firms operate, have different stock-price reactions. There we
find strong differences. In fact, large Japanese corporations have stock-price reactions closer to
those of American corporations for equity issues. However, large Japanese corporations still have
positive stock-price reactions to convertible issues, albeit significantly smaller than for small
corporations. Finally, we explore the relation between abnormal returns and the extent to which
a firm is financed by bank loans. For equity issues, firms with more bank loans have more
positive abnormal returns. Firms with no reported bank loans have an average abnormal return
of -0.92% on announcement of an equity issue in contrast to a matched sample of firms of similar
sue issuing equity in the same year which has an average abnormal return of 1.60W However,
bank loans are not helpful in understanding the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns
for convertible bond issue announcements.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe our sample in section 2. In section 3, we
5provide abnormal returns (or various subperiods of interest. In section 4, we explore possible
explanations for the stock-price reactions we observe. We conclude in section 5.
Section 2. The sample of issues and firm characteristics.
To obtain our sample, we proceed as follows. We start from the list of new issues from
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) Annual Securities Statistics for the period from January 1, 1985,
to May 31, 1991.8 We then exclude all new issues which do not satisfy the following criteria:
1) The issuing firm is listed on the TSE and stock price data are available on the daily
returns files from the Pacific-Basin Capital Market (PACAP) Research Center. The daily returns
files includes returns for all First and Second Section stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We
exclude utilities and financial companies (the required data for financial companies are not
available on the PACAP files which are used in this study).
2) The date of the initial public announcement is available from the morning edition of the
Nihon Keizai Shinbun.
3) The issue involves a single type of security, is not accompanied by a stock dividend,
and the firm does not release important information, such as earnings, with the announcement
of the issue. (Firms which simultaneously issue the same type of security on the domestic market
and offshore are excluded.)
Kato and Schallheim (1992, 1993) use the Commercial Law Review to construct samples
of private and public equity issues. Their study has only three full years which overlap with our
sample, namely 1985, 1986 and 1987. For these years, they have 19 private placements and 76
public equity issues in contrast to our 31 private placements and 37 public issues which are not
rights offerings. The samples differ because (1) we require an announcement in the Nihon Keizai
Shinbun, (2) they consider only firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, (3)
we exclude firms which simultaneously announce a stock dividend and (4) we exclude issues by
utilities and financial companies. The second difference may explain their smaller number of
private issues, whereas the exclusion of firms with simultaneous stock dividends and of financial
companies may help explain why we have fewer public equity issues
STable 1
Distribution of announcements or security offerings by type and by year
The announcements are by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which an event
date could be obtained from the Nihon Keizal Shinbun during the period from January 1,




1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Stock, public 9 9 19 33 82 30 3 185
Stock, private 13 9 9 13 10 9 6 69
Stock, rights 4 2 0 1 5 12 4 28
Straightbond 8 2 0 0 0 0 3 13
Warrantbond 0 4 1 0 5 7 2 19
Convertible
bond
70 73 122 117 124 42 13 561
Total 104 99 151 164 226 100 31 875
7These sample selection criteria produce a sample of 875 issues described in table 1 Our
sample contains mostly convertible debt issues and public equity issues. The predominance of
convertible debt issues is not surprising given the aggregate statistics on security offerings
published by NUmi (1992a). Niimi (1992a) shows thai convertible debt is the principal source of
public funds for Japanese companies throughout the Eighties. Our sample understates the
importance of equity-linked debt for Japanese firms since it includes only domestic issues. As
discussed in Kang et al. (1994), dollar-denominated warrant bond issues were a major source of
funds for Japanese companies during the 1980s. We found few strai9hl debt issues. In addition,
we found almost no warrant bonds. Again, this is not particularly surprising in light of Ihe statistics
in Niimi (1992a). There is some clustering of the issues during the height of the bubbleeconomy
period. More than 40% of the equity issues and about 25% of the convertible issues are in 1989.
Ranaeda (1993) shows that finns issued only rights offerings in the 1950s, but that over
time the proportion of underwritten equity offeringsamong equity issues increased to reach the
point where most equity issues are underwritten offerings. This shift towards underwritten
offenngs has made Japanese firms more similar to American firms in their issuing practices. It
is interesting that more than half of the rights offerings inour sample take place after the
spectacular growth in the Nikkei 225 index has stopped. Based on our sample, we cannot tell
whether this corresponds to a resurgence of rights offeringsor to the unique circumstances
associated with the end of the "bubble economy°.9
Table 2 shows the characteristics of firms issuing the varioustypes of securities. These
financial data are obtained from the PACAP Research Center database and from theAnalyst's
l-fanaeda (1993) provides evidence on the total number of eachtype of equity issue for each
year from 1970 to 1990. He finds that the proportion of rights offerings as a fraction of the total
number of issues is larger in 1990 than inany year during the 1980s, but he does not note this
fact in his analysis.
8Table 2
Cflaracteristics of the Issuing firms
The announcements are by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which an event date could be obtained from the Niflon Keizal Shinbun
during the period from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991 and for which
information is available from the PACAP files. The Yen amounts are in billion
Yen. Beta is estimated from -220 to -20, where date 0 is the announcement
date of the issue. The 0 proxy is (total liabilities + market value of equi-
ty)/(total liabilities + book value of equity). Leverage is measured as (total
liabilities)/(total liabilities + market value of equity). The first number in each












































































































9Guide by Daiwa Institutes of Research Ltd. We use the 1985 edition of Industrial Groupings in
Japan by Dodwell Marketing Consultants to determine each firm's Keiretsu affiliation. It is
apparent from table 2 that, compared to firms issuing convertible debt, finns issuing equity are
smaller, and that the size of the issue is large relative to the value of existing equity. Price-
earnings ratios are similar across firms issuing equity and convertible debt in public offerings, but
obviously are high compared to the U.S.. Our proxy for Tobins Q is similar across firms. Leverage
ratios are slightly higher for firms issuing equity. These measures use the market value or equity
in the denominator, which explains why they are not higher.
Section 3. The stock-price reaction to security offerings.
In table 3, we provide estimates of excess retums over various subperiods. The excess
returns are computed in the following way. We group the TSE securities into ten equal size
control portfolios ranked according to their Scholes and Williams (1977) beta estimates computed
with respect to the PACAP equally-weighted portfolio for Japan. Then, we assign the stock of
'ung firm to one ni these portfolios. We compute the abnormal return on a particular day
by tkr.. be difference between the return on the issuing flmts stock andan equally-weighted
ctntrca r.nrifolio Though the event period comprising the day of the announcement and theday
befcre S the one researchers typically focus on for U.S. studies,we pay rnore attention to the
nd::! .-.h.ch inckjdes the day after the announcement.Including this additional day eliminates
5or'e of the microstructure effects which could arise because of order flow imbalanceson the day
of the announcement and because of the existence ofprice limits.
We discuss the abnormal retum estimates for each type of issue in turn:
I. Public equity offerings. The announcement return, definedas the cumulative return
for the three-day window surrounding the publication of theannouncement, is significantly positive
10Table 3
Average cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement (AD) and Issuance
(ID) of security offerings
The sample includes 875 announcements between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991by
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the issuing firm's
return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williarns beta estimate.
Medians and I-statistics are in parentheses.,andindicate significance of the sign -
rank test at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.






























































































































































































































































but small. 0.45% with a t-statistic of 1.73. The median is 0.34%, and the sign-rank test statistic
is not significant. The results are slightly stronger for the two-day window which includes the
announcement day and the day before. During the 19 days preceding the announcement, there
are nine negative abnormal returns and 10 positive abnormal returns. Only one of these abnormal
returns is significantly different from zero, namely day -19, which is -0.22% with a t-statistic of -
1.74. This evidence indicates that our announcement date is meaningful. Day -1 with an
abnormal return of 0.41%, has the highest abnormal return in absolute value for days -20 to 0
and the highest t-statistic. None of the 10 days following the announcement have a significant
abnormal return. On the issuance day, the abnormal retum is negative. Its mean, median and
t-statistic are all greater in absolute value than the announcement day abnormal return. For the
10 days preceding the issue day, one abnormal return is significantly positive and twO are
significantly negative. The day after the issue is significantly negative, but none of the next nine
12days are significantly different from zero. Seven of these next nine days have a positive abnormal
return though. Table 3 shows that the cumulative abnormal returns from the day before the
announcement to the day after the issue are insignificant. Further, after the issue, the cumulative
returns for the next 20 days are negative, but the mean is insignificant. Finally returns from day -
60 before the announcement to day +20 after the issue are insignificantly negative. Since the
issue day abnormal return is signilicant, we provide a measure of the total abnormal return
associated with the announcement and issue dates. To gel this measure, we add up the
abnormal return for the three days surrounding the announcement date and the three days
surrounding the issue date. For equity issues, the mean of this total effect measure is
insignificantly negative; the median is also negative and the sign-rank test is significant at the
0.05 level.
2. Private equity issues. Here, the effect is largely similar to what is found in the U.S.1°
There is a large significant effect for the three days surrounding the announcement day. The
stock-price reaction is 3.13% with a t-statistic of 2.39. There is no additional effect on issuance
day. Private equity tinancings are shown here for the sake of completeness. They have been
analyzed extensively by Kato and Schallheim (1993) over the period 1974 to 1988. They report
an abnormal return of 4.98% on the board date and the day following the board date for their
sample.
3. Rights offerings. The stock-price reaction to rights offerings is strongly positive on the
announcement day. There is no further effect on issuance day. In contrast, the announcement
day effect in the U.S. is close to zero)'
4. StraIght bond Issuei. Neither the announcement nor the issue date abnormal returns
° See Wruck (1989).
See Eckbo and Masulis (1992).
13are statistically significant. Since there are so few issues, however, the average abnormal returns
are not estimated precisely. It is interesting to note that the economic significance of the total
abnormal returns for straight bond issues is similar to the economic significance of the total
abnormal returns for the warrant bond issues and the convertible bond issues discussed next.
The total average abnormal return is 1.53% with a t-statistic of 1.45.
5. Warrant bond Issues. We have 19 offerings, in contrast to the 368 offshore offerings
in Kang et at. (1994). There is no significant stock-price reaction to the issue announcement, but
a positive stock-price reaction to the issuance is found when the three days surrounding the
issuance are considered. The total average abnormal return is 1.34% with a t-statistic of 1.45.
6. ConvertIble bond Issues. The stock-price reaction to convertible bond issues is
surprisingly similar to the reaction documented in Kang et al. (1994) for offshore warrant bonds.
We find a significant positive reaction to the announcement of 1.05% for the three days
surrounding the announcement. For the 19 days before the day preceding the announcement,
there is one significant abnormal return on day -9. On that day, there is an increase of 0.15% with
a t-statistic of 1.70. The day -9 abnormal return is the largest for these 19 days. Itis much
smaller than the day 0 announcement return of 0.77% which has a t-statistic of 7.20. Following
the announcement, all abnormal returns from day +1 to day +10 are positive except for day +2.
In addition, three of these abnormal returns are significantly positive. This positive drift is clear
from the table, which shows that from day +1 after the announcement date to day-i before the
issuance dale, the cumulative abnormal return is 2.79% with a t-statistic of 6.67. Kang et al.
(1994) also find a positive drift after the announcement of offshore warrant bond issues. Over the
three days surrounding issuance, the abnormal return is significantly positive. There is some
negative dnft from days +1 after the issue to day +20. Over these days, the cumulative abnormal
return is -1.21% with a t-statistic of -3.66. The total effect measure is positive and significant.
14Section 4. Interpretation of the results.
In this section, we focus on public equity and convertible debt issues. his dear from the
evidence in section 3 that the average total effect of the announcements associated with public
equity issues is not significantly different from zero and that the average total effect of the
announcements associated with public convertible debt issues is significantly positive. In studies
of Japanese corporate finance, it is tempting to focus first and foremost on differences in the
organization of firms with respect to the U.S. However, there are also differences in how markets
are organized and these differences may be important for our sample. Before focusing on the
implications of the organization of firms for our results, we address first potential explanations for
our results which have to do with the organization of markets, the regulation of corporate finance
in Japan and the "bubble economy."
4.1. Market organization effects.
Our results have several puzzling aspects which appear inconsistent with the hypothesis
that markets are working without impediments. We consider in turn the puzzles concerning equity
issues and convertible debt issues.
a) Equity issues. For equity issues, there is a significant positive abnormal return for the
three days surrounding the announcement. This suggests that the market views an equity issue
as a positive event. Since the issuance itself confirms that a positive event is taking place for
sure, one would expect a slight positive return. Instead, we observe a significant negative return
of -1.01% on the three days surrounding the issue with a t-statistic of -3.82.
Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) propose an explanation for the fall of 0.3% on the day
of the issue for industrial firms in the U.S.. They argue that there is an order-flow imbalance on
that day because individuals who want to buy the stock use the secondary issue to do so, so that
15on the primary market there are more sell orders than buy orders and the recorded prices are
more likely to be bid prices than ask prices. Since trading costs are substantially higher in Tokyo
than in the U.S., the same explanation could be at work here.12 If this explanation is correct, one
would expect prices to bounce back after the issue day. There is no evidence of prices
rebounding. The median abnormal return is never positive For the 10 days following the issue day.
Although only three or the mean abnormal returns are negative in these 10 days. the highest I-
statistic is 1.06 and the highest mean abnormal return, 0.205%, on day +5 is lower in absolute
value than the lowest mean abnormal return, -0.226%, on day +9. Finally, for the 20 days
following the issue announcement, both the average abnormal return and the median are
negative. Though the t-statistic is insignificant, the sign-rank test, statistic is significant at the 0.01
level, Of course, it could be the case that there is a negative drift after the offering that is partially
offset by reversal& In regressions not reported here, we regressed the three-day issue abnormal
return on the log of the market value of equity and the log of share price. Neither variable has a
significant coefficient.
An alternative explanation could be that, rather than the price at the end of the issue day
being abnormally low, the price the day before is abnormally high because of price support. In
Japan. the offering day is the day when those who subscribed pay for the shares they bought.
Hence, there is no reason to support the share price after the offering day. Underwriters are
allowed to support the stock price between the day when the offering is priced and the offering
12 See Hamao and Hasbrouèk(1992) For a description of the Tokyo market and estirnates of
the spread For the limit-order book. They investigate three stocks, all of which have a substantially
higher capitalization than the average stock of a firm issuing equity in our sample. Their highest
average spread is 1%, It could be that the spread for the stocks in our sample exceeds 1%, so
that the negative abnormal return on issue day would be comparable in its relation to the spread
with the negative abnormal return on issue day in the U.S.
16day. This period normally corresponds to the ten days before the offering day.'3 Although! price
support or ramping seems to be a plausible explanation for the pattern of stock returns we
observe, we had no success in finding (races of price support in the data. In our investigation, we
focused on two samples of raw returns. The first sample (pre-sarnple) includes the raw returns
for the ten days before the issue for each firm. The second sample (post-sample) includes the
raw returns for the ten days starting thirty days after equity issues take place for each firm. The
pre-sample has 1766 returns and the post sample 1827. The pre-sample has a mean return of
0.068% in contrast to 0.147% for the post-sample; the variance of the returns in the pre-sample
is slightly lower than in the post-sample (4.76% versus 5.55%) and the skewness is slightly higher
(0.92 versus 0.80). At best, the variance and skewness results indicate faint evidence of price
support. However, this evidence becomes even weaker when one looks at the proportion of
negative returns. In the pre-sample, 33.24% of the returns are below -0.6% compared to 36.45%
in the post-sample. If we focus on returns lower than -3%, we find that 5.78% of the before-
sample are below -3% in comparison with 6.13% of the returns in the post sarnple. We tried to
relate the offering day abnormal return to the number of days in the previous ten days the firm
experienced a negative stock return in excess of one standard deviation of the firms return. If a
firm's stock price benefits from price support, one would see few such large negative returns but
one would expect a sharp drop on the offering day. Therefore, it is likely that there is a positive
relation between the nurnber of large negative returns and the offering day abngrnial returns.
Instead, we found a negative insignificant relation.
b) Convertible debt issues. The announcement effect for convertible debt is positive and
significant. The issue day announcement effect is also positive and significant, but much smaller.
This is consistent with markel efficiency if there is some probability that the issue will not take
13 See Hanaeda (1993).
17place and the stock market reacts negatively to the news that the issue will not take place. What
seems harder to explain is the existence of positive abnormal returns from the time of the issue
announcement to the day before the issue. We find a cumulative abnormal return of 2.79% with
a t-statistic of 6.67. This result suggests that a trading strategy of investing in the stock when the
firm announces a convertible issue and selling the stock immediately before the issue date has
a positive abnormal return which exceeds potential transactions costs. One concern is that these
trading profits could reflect the use of an inappropriate benchmark for returns computed over long
periods of time. However, although we do not report the results in a table, we investigated
whether these cumulative abnormal returns depend on firm size by splitting our sample of firms
into large and small firms. We found that the cumulative abnormal return from the day after the
announcement to the day before the issue is 2.67% for the large firms with a median of 1.29%
and is 2.90% br the small firms with a median of 1.05%. Neither the mean nor the median
difference is significant. It therefore seems unlikely that these cumulative abnormal returns are
due to a misspecified benchmark.
The evidence sug9ests that the positive abnormal returns for convertible bond issues are
more convincing than for equity issues. In either case, though, there is no evidence of a price
drop of the magnitude observed for U.S. firms.
4.2. Deregulation effects.
In the 1980s, there was considerable deregulation in Japan. Before the 1980s, financing
through domestic bond issues was extremely difficult for Japanese companies.' First, unsecured
issues were not allowed. Second, firms wishing to issue secured bonds could only do so if they
" See Hoshi,Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) and Niimi (1992a.b) lot discussions of the
evolution of the Japanese bond market and of the evolulion of the eligibility criteria for bond
issuance.
18satisfied restrictive balance sheet conditions. Qualifying firms could issue only atspecified times
determined both by a queuing system and the practice of only issuing bonds at the end of the
month. The thoice of maturity for bonds was restricted. Lead managers were assigned to firTns
on a rotating basis to insure a balance of underwriting income among the Oig Four securities
firms. Finally, interest rates on public bonds were regulated.
In 1979, Sears Roebuck made the first unsecured foreign bond issue on the Japanese
market. Immediately following that issue, a regulatory standard for issuing unsecured bonds was
adopted. It was so stringent that, until January 1983, only Toyota Motors and Matsushita Electric
were allowed to issue domestic unsecured bonds. In January 1983, nine additional firms were
allowed to issue unsecured straight debt and 23 more firms were allowed to issue unsecured
convertible debt. The standards were progressively relaxed, so that by 1987, 180 firms were
allowed to issue unsecured straight debt and 330 firms were allowed to issue unsecured
convertible debt. A revision to the Commercial Code in April 1991 made the issuing standards
less of an obstacle for most firms.
Changes in eligibility requirements to issue debt and equity-linked debt could explain
positive abnormal returns. To see this, suppose that long-term shareholders allow firms to access
capital markets, after they become eligible, only if their prospects are good enough that close
monitoring of their actions through banks is no longer necessary.'5 In this case, the first issue
after a firm becomes eligible would convey information to the markets that a firm hasgood
prospects. Hence, a first issue could reveal different information for Japanese firms during this
sample period than for American firms because Japanese firms were allowed, for the first time,
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) provide a model where the best firms raise funds
on public markets because they do not benefit from dose monitoring as much as other firms.
They provide some empirical support of their model by investigating how reliance on bank loans
changed across firms during the 1980s in Japan.
19to choose the amount of public debt in their capital structure.
Table 4 provides evidence on abnormal returns for firms which already have convertible
debt and firms for which the convertible debt issue appears to be the first one. The stock-price
reaction is significant for both groups of issues, but the stock-price reaction to a second issue is
significantly smaller than the stock-price reaction to a first issue. There is therefore no evidence
that firms which are not constrained by eligibility requirements entering the sample have stock-
price reactions more comparable to those of American firms. Some convertible issues are
secured, but most are not. Since it was easier to issue a convertible secured issue, it may be that
looking at the whole sample obscures the effects of deregulation. We found 47 secured
convertible issues and 385 unsecured convertible issues; for 129 issues, we could not determine
whether the issue is secured or not. The average abnormal returns for secured and unsecured
convertibles are 079% and 0.73%, respectively. The average abnormal return for a firm's first
unsecured issue (82 issues) is 1.10% versus 0.65% for other issues. The difference is not
statistically significant.
Another way to look at the role of deregulation is to investigate the relation between a
firm's credit rating and the stock-price reaction to a convertible issue. Firms with a high rating are
less likely to be affected by deregulation. Table 4 separates firms between those with a rating of
A, AA and AAA on the one hand and those with a rating of B, 60, and BBB on the other hand.
The ratings are collected from the Nihon KeIzal Shinbun. The firms with a low rating have
significantly higher stock-price reactions, but the stock-price reactions are positive for both groups
of firms.
If deregulation explains our results, it should be the case that stock-price reactions
become similar to the stock-price reactions of American firms in the later years in the sample. In
table 5, we provide estimates of stock-price reactions year by year for equity issues and for
20Table 4
Abnormal returns by convertible debt outstanding and by bond ratings for
convertible bond Issues
The sample includes 561 public offerings of convertible debt between January 1, 1985 and
May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The daily excess return is the
issuing flints return minus the return on a control portfolio with a similar Scholes-Williams
beta estimate. The t-statistic for the difference is under the assumption of unequal variance.







































21convertible debt issues. For public equity issues, it appears that two years have much higher
abnormal returns, namely 1985 and 1987.16 For each of these two years, the average stock-price
reaction is more than three times higher than the next highest average stock-price reaction. We
recomputed the average stock-price reaction for equity issues without 1985 and 1987. The 3-day
announcement abnormal return without these two years is 0.24% with a t-statistic of 0.86. This
evidence suggests the conclusion that the positive stock-price reaction to the announcement of
equity issues for Japanese firms is unlikely to be a permanent feature of Japanese corporate
finance.
4.3. "Bubble economy" effects.
We now briefly consider the effect of the "bubble economy" on the stock-price reaction.
The dramatic increase in the Nikkei 225 index stopped at the end of 1989. Ii we split the sample
between issues before 1990 and issues in 1990 and 1991, the stock-price reaction to the 33
issues in 1990 and 1991 is -0.38% with a t-statistic of -0.61, whereas the stock-price reaction to
the 152 issues beFore 1990 is 0.64% with a t-statistic of 2.21, The difference between these two
samples is an economically significant 1.02% with a t-statistic of 1.47. This provides further
evidence that the significant positive abnormal returns for equity issues announcement are limited
to a subset of our sample. It provides only limited evidence about the effect of the "bubble
economy" because all but five of the issues in our sample for 1990 and 1991 are in January and
February 1990.
No year seems to be particularly influential for the stock-price reaction to convertible bond
issues. In particular, four years have an average announcement abnormal return inexcess of 1%
These two years constitute half of the sample of announcements for the 1 980s used by
Kato and Schallheim (1992) who find anaverage abnormal return of 0.76% with a t-statistic of
2.14 for the Board date and the following day fora sample from 1984 to March 1988.
22Table 5
Abnormal returns by year for equity and convertible Issues
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings
between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio
with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. AD denotes the day the issue is announced
in the Nihon Keizai Shinbun and ID denotes the day of issuance. Medians, t-statistics and
the sample size are in parentheses., ", andindicate significance of the sign-rank test
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.


























































































































23with a t-statistic in excess of 2. For convertible debt issues, the post-bull market 1991 sample
shows the highest average abnormal return and the highest median in our sample. The mean
abnormal return for issues before 1990 is 1.06% with a t-statistic of 6.65 in contrast to 0.96% with
a t-statistic of 2.13 for issues in 1990 and 1991. The difference between these two subsamples
is not significant at the 0.10 level.
4.4. The role of differences in the organization of firms.
It is often argued that Japan and the U.S. differ fundamentally in that Japanese managers
have long horizons and U.S. managers have short horizons. One possible explanation (or this
difference, if it truly exists, is that long-term shareholders play an important role in Japanese firms.
These shareholders, however, have a complex relationship with the firm in that they hold shares,
hold debt, and conduct business transactions with it. As argued in Kang et at. (1994), it may well
be that the best analogy for such investors is Admati and Pfleiderer's (1994) fixed fraction
investors. If the controlling investors hold a constant fraction of alt payouts from the firm, then new
issues do not convey information about the mispricing of existing securities and the arguments
of Myers and MajIuf (1984) for why share prices fall followin9 issues of risky securities do not
apply.
If Japanese managers pursue different goals than American managers, in the sense that
they do not care as much about wealth redistribution resulting from the sale of mispriced
securities and are unwilling to sacrifice positive NPV projects to avoid such wealth redistribution,
then they are less likely to issue following periods of positive abnormal returns for their securities
than American managers. In the U.S., firms issue stock following periods of positive abnormal
24returns.'7 The explanation for this phenomenon advanced by Lucas and McDonald (1990) is that
the stock is least likely to be underpriced following a period when it has done extremely well. If
Japanese firms behave differently, one would not expect to observe this phenomenon. Table 6
shows that Japanese firms do not issue equity or convertible bonds following significant positive
excess returns. In fact, they seem to issue convertible debt following periods of significant
negative excess returns. Further, there is no significant relation between announcement abnormal
returns and abnormal returns preceding the announcement. These results hold equally if we use
raw returns instead of abnormal returns. Hence, the adverse selection explanation for the
abnormal returns associated with new issues does not appear to hold for Japanese firms.
An alternative way of investigating the role of institutionat arrangements is to compare the
abnormal returns for firms where management is more likely to behave like the management of
American firms. Table 7 provides evidence on this issue. First, we divide the sample between
firms that belong to a horizontal Keiretsu and (hose that do not. We find some difference between
the two groups for equity issues. Namely, whereas there is no difference on issue day, the
Keiretsu firms are the only ones with a significant abnormal return on the announcement day.
Unfortunately, the difference between the two groups of finns is not significant. This result is
similar to the one found in Kang et al. (1994) for offshore warrant bond issues. In contrast, when
we look at convertible bond issues, there is no difference whatsoever between the two groups on
the announcement date and the non-keiretsu firms have a significant abnormal return on issue
date but the Keiretsu firms do not.
As emphasized by Saxonhouse (1993), alternative Keiretsu classifications lead to very
different lists of member firms. Consequently, the fact that Keiretsu membership is not very helpful
See Asquith and Mullins (1986). Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1990) provide a detailed
analysis of the excess returns before an issue.
25Table 6
Excess returns prior to the Issue announcement and their correlation with the
announcement abnormal return
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings
between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio
with a similar Scholes-Williams beta esttmate. The announcement day (AD) is the day the
issue is announced in the Nihon Keizal Shinbun and AR denotes the abnormal return for
the 3 days surrounding the announcement day. Medians and t-statistics are in parentheses.
indicates significance of the sign-rank test at the 0.01 level.
Public equity issues Public convertible issues
A. Stock return for







B. Portfolio return for
































Abnormal returns by Kelretsu membership, firm size and bank loans
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings
between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio
with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. AD denotes the day when the issue is
announced in the Nihon Keizal Shinbun and ID denotes the issuance day. Medians, t-
statistics and the sample size are in parentheses. ,, andindicate significance of the
sign-rank test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.





















































































































27C. FIrms with bank loan financing versus firms with no bank loan financing, matching by
the market value of equity and by the year of issue.
















Firms with bank loans





































in predicting abnormal returns may simply mean that our Keiretsu classification is not precise
enough. This problem suggests an alternative approach to identify the firms that resemble
American firms the most, namely the use of firm size. Large firms are less likely to be constrained
in their actions by their shareholders or by a main bank. In particular, large firms are unlikely to
have to rely mostly on bank borrowing for their financing. Panel B of table 7 provides strong
evidence that size matters. Large firms have a significant negative abnormal return for the three-
day window surrounding the announcement day in contrast to small firms which have a significant
increase for equity issues. For convertible bond issues, the announcement effect is also
significantly larger for small firms, but the announcement effect is positive for both sets of firms.
On issue day, there is no significant dflference.
An obvious concern with the size results is that they are subject to alternative
interpretations. For instance size might help understand the crnss-sectional variation in abnormal
returns because of microstructural effects or because size is related to the degree of information
asymmetry about a firm. The argument that size proxies for microstructural effects is that small
28firms tend to have lower stock prices, so that the fixed part of transaction costs is more important
for these firms relative to the stock price. We find that there is a significant relation between price
and abnormal return in regressions that do not control for size. However, when abnormal returns
are regressed on size and price, price is never significant and size is always significant. Heice,
the explanation for the role of size is not a mechanical microstructural explanation having to do
with the stock price. We estimated similar regressions for the issue day return and found no
significant coefficient, indicating that this abnormal return may not be related to micgostwcture
effects either. In the U.S., it is often argued that informational asymmetries are greater for small
firms than for large firms. In the context of the Myers and MajIuf (1984) model, this would suggest
a greater price drop for small firm equity issues than for large firm equity issues, which obviously
is the opposite result from the one observed here. It could be, though, that equity issues have a
positive effect and that issues by small finns are more unexpected than issues by large firms.
This interpretation would be promising if the average abnormal return for large firms was
insignificantly different from zero; instead, it is significantly negative.
Even if large firms are more similar to U.S. firms, this may be because they have better
access to capital markets rather than because of control considerations. One way to get a better
perspective on this issue is to focus on firms of similar size but different reliance on bank loans
Because these firms have similar size, their access to capital markets should be similar and if
their abnormal returns differ, it most likely would be because the ones with bank loans are
monitored by banks in contrast to the firms with no bank loans. In panel C of table 7, we also
compare announcement abnormal returns between firms in our sample with no bank loan
financing and firms with loan financing by banks or other financial intermediaries (these two
categories of loans are aggregated in the accountin9 data reported by PACAP). Since bank loans
became tess important during our sample period (see Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993)),
29it is important to make sure that announcements by firms without bank loans are compared to
contemporaneous announcements by firms with banks loans. The results reported in panel C of
table 7 are striking. The firms with banks loans have significantly higher abnormal returns than
the firms without banks loans for equity issues. The difference of 2.52% is not only statistically
significant, but it is also economically large. It is puzzling, though, that firms with bank loans in
this matched sample also have a large negative stock-price reaction on the offering day.
Nevertheless, there is no significant difference on the offering day between the two samples.
Although we do not report these results in the table, we also split the sample into two according
to loans to total assets. Firms with loans to total assets above the sample median have a three-
day abnormal return associated with the announcement of equity issues of 1.16% that is
significantly larger than the abnormal return of -0.26% of the firms with loans to total assets below
the sample median (at the 0.01 level). The loan component of a firm's capital structure is related
to the announcement abnormal return for equity issues, but not to the announcement abnormal
return for convertible debt issues. There is no significant difference in panel C of table 7 between
convertible issuing firms that rely on bank loans and those that do not; in addition, there is also
no significant difference when we compare abnormal returns for firms with loans to total assets
above the sample median and below the sample median.
Table 8 presents estimates of multivariate regressions which use the three-day announce-
ment abnormal return as the dependent variable. We present six regressions. The first Iwo show
that size is more important than price in explaining the cross-sectional variation of abnormal
returns. The next two regressions provide some evidence that firms belonging to a horizontal
Keiretsu have higher abnormal returns. The coefficient on the Keiretsu indicator variable is
positive and significant at the 0.10 level for equity issues and it is positive, but insignificant, for
convertible bond issues.
30Table 8
Muitivariate regression of 3-day announcement abnormal returns on firm characte-
ristics
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings
between January 1, 1965 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio
with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. The announcement day is the day when the
issue is announced in the Nihon Kelzal Shinbun. MV denotes the market value of the firm
in million Yen. Amount is the proceeds from the issue in billion Yen. Leverage is the ratio of
total liabilities to total assets (TA). Debt/TA is leverage minus loans to total assets. The
Keiretsu dummy takes value one it the firm belongs to a horizontal Keiretsu. All coefficients






















































































31Regressions 5 and 6 relate abnormal returns to several different variables that one might
expect to be related to abnormal returns based on U.S. results and on the analysis conducted
so far in this paper. Since past excess returns are not informative for the abnormal returns, we
use the PE ratio. writh the adverse selection model, one would expect PE to have a negative
effect on abnormal return far Japan because high PE firms would be more likely to issue, so their
issues would be more anticipated. Similarly, one would expect highly levered firms to be more
likely to issue if high leverage means that firms are farther away from their equilibrium capital
structure. The PE ratio is negatively related to the abnormal return. The coefficient is significant
at the 0.01 level for equity issues but is insignificant for convertible issues. We allow for a different
relation between loans and abnormal returns and between the remainder of the firm's liabilities
and abnormal returns. It turns out that the abnormal return for equity issues is positively related
to loans normalized by total assets and is unrelated to the magnitude of other liabilities
normalized by assets, With convertible debt issues, loans has a negative impact. However, this
negative impact is suspect. Since PEs can take extremely high values, it makes sense to
investigate whelher the regression results are affected by outliers. If we remove 5% of firms with
highest and lowest PEs in each sample, the regression for equity abnormal returns is essentially
unchanged, but loans/TA is no longer significant in the convertible regression.
In regressions not reported here for the convertible debt sample, we also included a
dummy variable for secured debt, the Gensaki rate, and a variable equal to the difference
between the coupon rate and the Gensaki rate as proxy for the magnitude of the equity
component of the convertible issue. The coefficients on secured debt and the Gensaki rate are
never significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the difference between the coupon rate and the
Gensaki rate has a positive coefficient and is always significant. This suggests that the stock price
reaction increases as the equity component falls. Since coupon rates were fairly standardized,
32this result should be interpreted with caution.
The coefficient on PE raises the question of whether Japan is as different from the U.S.
as argued so far. It could indicate that Japanese firms are as likely as U.S. firms to issue equity
when their valuation is high, so that in both countries high valuation firms have abnormal returns
dose to zero. With this view, the past excess returns might simply be poor valuation measures
for Japanese firms. It turns out tharthis impression is misleading and that RE does not play the
role one would expect it to play if high RE firms are more likely to be overvalued and Japanese
firms behave like U.S. firms. In table 9, we divide the sample into large and small firms and large
and small PE firms. Wthin firm size classes, PE does not lead to significant differences. Within
PE classes, size matters. Yet, for equity issues in panel A. the large firms with high PEs have
significantly negative abnormal returns of -0.91% with a t-statistic of -2.13, indicating that these
firms have announcement returns more similar to those of U.S. firms. At the same time, though,
there is no evidence that issues by firms with high PEs are more anticipated within a firm size
class: for both firm size classes, high RE firms have higher absolute value of abnormal returns.
The results for convertible issues in panel B of table 9 indicate that small firms with high PEs
have higher abnormal returns. In contrast, large firms with high PEs have lower abnormal retums.
Interestingly, the large firms with high PEs do not have significant positive abnormal retums.
Though PE does not lead to significant differences within size classes, it is puzzling that
for small firms abnormal returns seem to positively related to RE whereas for large firms the
opposite seems to be true. It turns out that this may be further evidence that large Japanese firms
are more similar to U.S. firms. We estimated a regression or abnormal returns on a constant, RE,
and PE times a dummy variable which takes value one if a firm has a market value of equity
above the sample median. For equity issues, PE is insignificant and the regression coefficient on
PE is -0.004 with a t-statistic of -0.312. In contrast, RE times the dummy variable has a
33Table 9
3-day announcement abnormal returns according to PE and firm size classes
The sample includes 185 public equity offerings and 561 public convertible debt offerings
between January 1, 1985 and May 31, 1991 by firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The daily excess return is the issuing firm's return minus the return on a control portfolio
with a similar Scholes-Williams beta estimate. The announcement day is the day when the
issue is announced in the Nlhon Kelzal Shinbun. Large firms are firms with market value
in excess of the median for firms issuing the same security. High PE firms are firms with a
PE greater than the median for firms issuing the same security.,and denote
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34regression coefficient of -0.02 with a t-slatistic of -2.76. Hence1 if PE matters, it does so only for
large firms. The regressions in table 8 therefore seem to contradict the results in table 9 because
they do not allow for PE to be related differently to abnormal returns for large and small firms.
Similar results hold for convertible issues, except there the coefficient of PE is 0.001 with a t-
statistic of 1.35.
Section 5. Conclusion.
Our main findings are as follows:
1. The average total abnormal return for equity-linked debt issues by Japanese companies
is unambiguously positive, whereas the average total abnormal return for public equity issues is
negative but insignificant. Hence, Japanese companies have stock-price reactions to security
issues that are different from those of the American companies.
2. For Japanese companies, the announcement day return is smaller in absolute value
than the issue day return for public equity issues, but not for convertible issues. The large issue
day return for public equity issues is puzzling in that it cannot be explained directly by
microstructure considerations or price support.
3. Deregulation seems to explain part of the significant positive abnormal return associated
with convertible issues, but not all of it.
4. Large Japanese companies have lower abnormal returns and hence have abnormal
returns which are closer to those experienced by American companies. In particular, the largest
Japanese companies in the sample have a significant negative stock-price reaction to public
equity issue announcements. There is also weak evidence that companies which do not belong
to a horizontal keiretsu have lower abnormal returns and strong evidence that firms with less
loans in their capital structure have lower abnormal returns than firms with more loans.
355. In contrast to American companies, Japanese companies do not issue equity or equity-
linked debt following a period ol positive abnormal returns.
The evidence in this paper is supportive of the view that during our sample period
Japanese managers issued securities with different objectives than American managers. In
particular, they were not as concerned about mispricing of existing securities as American
managers seem to be and consequently the stock market's reaction to issues of risky securities
was not as negative as Et typically is in the U.S. This is consistent with the view that Japanese
managers care less about short-term shareholders than American managers.
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